E N D O F H I S T O R Y ?
The first one who declared the end of history by implying it was
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. He thought that the movement of the
Enlightenment (Aufklärung) had done
its work, had accomplished the history, thus had been the last age
of history.
My questions:
1.) |
Is the end of history
merely an idea of an idealistic philosopher, so that this idea
will never be realised? |
2.) |
Is the end of history
not merely an idea of an idealistic philosopher, so that
this idea has or will have been realised? |
|
2.1) |
Has the end of history
been realised since the last third of the 18th century, when
the Enlightenment (Aufklärung)
ended? |
|
2.2) |
Has the end of history
been realised since 1989/'90, when the Cold War
ended? |
|
2.3) |
Will the end of history
have been realised in the end of the 21st, in the 22nd, or in
the 23nd century? |
Some people may say that the time after the end of history
is haeven on earth, some other people may say that the
time after the end of history is hell on earth.
There is no real historical develoment, nothing to do that really
counts, boredom, happiness, perhaps it is the (last) age
with machines, before the machines will completely replace all human
beings (**|**)
- this all depends upon the people's evaluation.
Please don't confuse the end of history with the end
of evolution - both are different. The end of history
does also not mean the end of human beings, at least
not necessarily. It can be, but it does not have to be that history,
human evolution, and even evolution simultaneously
end .
History began about 6000 years ago and will perhaps end in the
end of the 21st, or in the 22nd, or in the 23rd century (I refer
to one of the questions above; see: => 2.3). But remember that
all historical
existentials (alle historischen
Existenziale), how Ernst Nolte called them, have to be
eliminated, before one can say that the end of history is really
reached. The process which leads to the end of history has
to have the same dimension as the so-called neolithic
revolution had. And Nolte said that all historical existentials
have changed very much, but have not been elimanted yet.
(Cp. Ernst Nolte, Historische Existenz, 1998, p. 682 [**];
translated by me [**]).
I think, the post-historical age will be the the very
last age with machines, before the machines will completely replace
all human beings (**|**),
so in the end of the 21st, or in the 22nd, or in the 23rd century
history as we have been knowing it for about 6000 years will have
reached its end because all historical existentials
will probably be eliminated then.
We have a probabilty of about 20% to stop the procees which will
lead to the fact (!) that all human beings are completely
replaced by machines (**|**).
I merely see a possibility to stop it, if there will be an accident
which will lead to that stop. There will have to be a coincidence
like an accident in order to get that possibility. The human
reason by itself and the human emotion by itself
will never stop, but accelerate that process in favour of
the machines.
I would not encourage all young people to get children at
all, I would favor and support a policy which means just the
contrary to the current policy, thus the contrary to the irresponsible
mindlessness or abandon concerning (1) culture / civilisation, (2)
education, (3) demographics / reproduction / sexuality, (4) ethics
/ custom / morality / religion, (5) economics / ecology, (6) technique
/ technology, (7) science, and so on. This policy as the contrary
to the current policy would lead to more responsibility at all,
thus also when it comes to get children. Not the irresponsible,
but merely the responsible human beings would have childen
then.
1.) My emphasis on technology is because of the fact that nearly
all people don't care that technology changes them. They are almost
like the Eloi or the Last Men. That's dangerous and
terrible! Technology should never be underestimatied.
2.) Psyche as defined in modern times is - unfortunately - dangerous
and terrible too. In the German languuage there is - still (!) -
a difference (possible) between Psyche and Geist
(mind, conscience, consciousness,
awareness, knowledge, esprit,
spirit, génie, intelligence,
intellect, apprehension, brain, sense,
a.s.o. [**|**|**]),
but in the English language and all other languages that difference
is no longer possible (in former times it was!). What does
that mean? I think, the danger is, that, if there is no difference
between them, it is very much easier to enslave people.
If the psyche gets under control, then you have to have another
mechanism in order to defend your freedom. Currently the
psyche becomes a controlled instance, which it has never been before.
So there is no instance left for freedom. If you have another and
even a very much more powerful instance of freedom, you have
another and even a very much more powerful chance to defend your
freedom. Geist is this other instance of freedom,
and it's very much more powerful than psyche. But if you have no
word for this instance of freedom, then it is only a question of
time when you will get totally under control. If there is no instance
of freedom in language and in thinking, there soon will be no freedom
at all.
Most people really don't want freedom, but idols, ideology / religion,
thus slavery (which they always confuse with freedom).
Globalism as the One World, the One Nation,
is probably the last stage before the World of the Last Men
/ the World of the Morlocks and the Eloi will begin.
And the World of the Last Men will probably lead to
the World of No Men, but only Machines (**|**).
The western culture has conquered and captured the whole world,
not only politically and econimically, but also culturally, scientifically,
technically, and artistically. If there shall be a trial for creating
a new culture, than that will be very difficult to realise, because
nearly all people of the world have - more or less - internalised
the western culture. The westerners will be to weak for that task
and the others are also to weak or to mixed relating to their origins,
their confused positioning between their origins and their internalised
western culture, and their disability to break out of that internalised
western culture.
With the utmost probability the civilisation as a late kind of
the western culture will be continued and no new culture will arise.
Perhaps in this or the next century the history will end (**|**),
perhaps the evolution of the human beings will end, and perhaps
the evolution of many other living beings will end.
Ernst Nolte wrote (ibid, p. 10):
Es wird also für möglich gehalten, daß
bestimmte grundlegende Kennzeichen - oder Kategorien oder »Existenzialien«
- der historischen Existenz tatsächlich nur für das
sechstausendjährige »Zwischenspiel« der »eigentlichen
Geschichte« bestimmend waren und heute als solche verschwinden
oder bereits verschwunden sind, während andere weiterhin
in Geltung bleiben, obwohl auch sie einer tiefgreifenden Wandlung
unterliegen. Die Analyse solcher Existenzialien im Rahmen eines
»Schemas der historischen Existenz« ist das Hauptziel
dieses Buches.
My translation:
Thus, it is thought possible that certain fundamental characteristic
- or categories or »existentials« - of the historical
existence have been decisively only for the six thousand years
lasting »interlude« of the »actual history«
and now are disappearing as such or have already disappeared,
while others continued to remain in validity, although they are
also subjected to a profound transformation. The analysis of such
existentials within the framework of a »scheme of historical
existence« is the main goal of this book.
Ernst Nolte wrote (ibid, p. 672):
Befinden wir Menschen ... uns bereits in der »Nachgeschichte«
, wie wir den Zustand in Ermangelung eines besseren Terminus nennen
wollen, oder doch mindestens im Übergang dazu?
My translation:
Are we people ... already in the »post-history«
as we like to call the state for lack of a better term, or at least
in the transition to that?
Ernst Nolte wrote (ibid, p. 682):
Alle historischen Existenzialien ... haben ...
grundlegende Änderungen erfahren, und einige, wie der Adel
und der »große Krieg«, sind nicht mehr wahrzunehmen.
Aber selbst diese haben sich eher verwandelt, als daß sie
ganz verschwunden wären: Der große Krieg bleibt als
dunkle Drohung bestehen, und der Adel überlebt in gewisser
Weise als Pluralität der Eliten.
My translation:
All historical existentialia ... have ... been changed fundamentally,
and some, like the nobleness and the »Great War«,
are no longer perceivable. But even these have been transformed
rather than that they were all gone: the great war remains as
a dark threat, and the nobility survived in some ways as pluralism
of elites.
That are some sentences Nolte wrote in his bulky book, which was
published in 1998: Historische Existenz (Historical
Existence).
The historical existentials are merely points of reference
in order to find out, whether history has ended or not.
History has not ended yet.
According to Hegels Dialektik
e.g. Fukuyama interprets the extreme liberalism as the
Thesis, the totalitarianism as the Antithesis,
the liberal democracy as the Synthesis.
So for Fukuyama the liberal democracy is the final stage.
According to Peter Scholl-Latour Fukuyamas thesis has been
absurd since its beginning; the global spread of parliamentary democracy
and an uninhibited market economy would bring mankind a final state
of wellfare / wellbeing and harmony; thus, the final line would
be drawn under the obsolete antagonisms. In this way Fukuyamas
notion of the End of History can be resumed. (Cp. Peter
Scholl-Latour, Koloß auf tönernen Füßen,
2005, S. 47). In addition, Peter Scholl-Latour found - to his surprise
- that Peter Sloterdijk coined the phrase: By »nation
building« you get at best democratically cladded dictatorships
with market economy. Scholl-Latour: I would have added:
»Serving the market economy«. (Ibid., 2005, S.
50). Fukuyamas bold thesis of the end of history
of eternal fights, because the Western model (i.e.: Western culture)
has triumphed globally, provides at least for Huntington no substantial
analysis. Rather, Huntington sees in the clashes, frictions, conflicts
between the great cultures on the basis of different religions and
divergent world views, the main role of future disputes. **
Fukuyamas thesis is assessed by Norbert Bolz in this way:
In the initial diagnosis, there is a surprisingly large consensus
among thinkers. The famous title of Francis Fukuyamas book
- The End of History and the Last Man - summarises quite simply
together the positions of Hegel and Nietzsche. (Norbert Bolz,
Das Wissen der Religion, 2008, S. 53). This world has been
defined as housing of servitude by Max Weber. The Gestell
(something like frame / framework o.s.)
by Martin Heidegger, the managed world by Theodor W.
Adorno, and the technical government by Helmut Schelsky
are only different names for the end product of a specifically modern
process, which Arnold Gehlen has brought on the notion of cultural
crystallisation. **
Peter Sloterdijk sees Fukuyamas work as the recovery
of an authentic political psychology on the basis of the restored
Eros-Thymos polarity. It is obvious that this same political psychology
(which has little to do with the so-called mass psychology
and other applications of psychonalyse to political objects) has
been moved to new theoretical orientations by the course of events
at the center of the current demand. .... The time diagnostic lesson,
that is hidden in »The End of History«, is not to be
read from the title slogan, which, as noted, citing only a witty
interpretation of Hegelian philosophy by Alexandre Kojève
in the thirties of the 20th century (who for his part had dated
the »end of history« in the year of publication of Hegels
Phänomenologie des Geistes [Phenomenology of Spirit],
1807). It consists in a careful observation of the prestige and
jealousy fights between citizens of the free world, who just then
come to the fore when the mobilization of civilian forces has ceased
for fighting on external fronts. Successful liberal democracies,
recognises the author, will always and because of their best performances
be crossed by streams of free-floating discontent. This can not
be otherwise, because people are sentenced to thymotic restlessness,
and the »last men« more than all the rest ....
(Peter Sloterdijk, Zorn und Zeit, 2006, S. 65-67). **
For Fukuyama thymos is nothing else than the psychological
seat of the Hegelian desire for Anerkennung (appreciation,
recognition, tribute). (Cp. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History,
1992, p. 233 ); this is the real engine of human history
(ibid., p. 229). The main features of which Fukuyama is based and
from which he derives his ideas are the Hegelian view of history
and the Platonic-Hegelian conceptual constructions, especially that
what is concerned with thymotic. Something near that is what Sloterdijk
has done in his work Zorn und Zeit (Rage
and Time, 2006). Both Sloterdijk and Fukuyama are also
influenced by Hegel and Nietzsche, Sloterdijk in addition by Heidegger.
**
But Sloterdijk's work mentions also the Christian era referring
to revenge and resentment:
Vor allem muß heute, gegen Nietzsches ungestümes
Resümee, bedacht werden, daß die christliche Ära,
im ganzen genommen, gerade nicht das Zeitalter der ausgeübten
Rache war. Sie stellte vielmehr eine Epoche dar, in der mit großem
Ernst eine Ethik des Racheaufschubs durchgesetzt wurde. Der Grund
hierfür muß nicht lange gesucht werden: Er ist gegeben
durch den Glauben der Christen, die Gerechtigkeit Gottes werde dereinst,
am Ende der Zeiten, für eine Richtigstellung der moralischen
Bilanzen sorgen. Mit dem Ausblick auf ein Leben nach dem Tode war
in der christlichen Ideensphäre immer die Erwartung eines überhistorischen
Leidensausgleichs verbunden. Der Preis für diese Ethik des
Verzichts auf Rache in der Gegenwart zugunsten einer im Jenseits
nachzuholenden Vergeltung war hoch - hierüber hat Nietzsche
klar geurteilt. Er bestand in der Generalisierung eines latenten
Ressentiments, das den aufgehobenen Rachewunsch selbst und sein
Gegenstück, die Verdammnisangst, ins Herzstück des Glaubens,
die Lehre von den Letzten Dingen, projizierte. Auf diese Weise wurde
die Bestrafung der Übermütigen in alle Ewigkeit zur Bedingung
für das zweideutige Arrangement der Menschen guten Willens
mit den schlimmen Verhältnissen. Die Nebenwirkung hiervon war,
daß die demütigen Guten selbst vor dem zu zittern begannen,
was sie den übermütigen Bösen zudachten. -
Peter Sloterdijk, Zorn und Zeit, 2006, S. 4.
My translation:
Especially must now against Nietzsche's impetuous résumé
be considered that the Christian era, on the whole, just was not
the age of the force exerted revenge. Rather, it represented a period
in which very seriously the ethics of revenge deferral was enforced.
The reason for this must be sought not for long: It is given by
the faith of Christians, God's justice will one day, at the end
of times, make the correction of the moral balance sheets. With
the prospect of a life after death in the Christian sphere of idea
the expectation was always connected of an hyper-historical suffering
compensation. The price of this ethic of renunciation of revenge
in the present in favour of a backdated retribution in the afterlife
was highly - Nietzsche has clearly judged that. It consisted in
the generalisation of a latent resentment that projected the repealed
revenge desire itself and its counterpart, the damnation fear, into
the heart of the faith, the doctrine of the Last Things. In this
way, the punishment of the proud in all eternity became a condition
for the ambiguous arrangement of people of good will with the dire
conditions. The side effect of this was that the humble good ones
(do-gooder) began to shake theirselves against what they intend
for the wanton evil.
Fukuyamas liberal democracy as the Synthesis?
Then it is up to him to object that or not. For me the current Synthesis
is not something like a liberal democracy, but the globalism:
containing amongst others an ochlocracy (anarchy) in order to get
the monarchy. Probably the iberal democracy had been
a Synthesis for a short time in the last fourth of the 18th century,
namely the Synthesis of the Thesis democracy/oligarchy (egalitarianism)
and the Antithesis liberalism/individualism (libertarianism).
Fukuyama confuses his time (especially his Zeitgeist) with Hegel's
time (especially Hegel's Zeitgeist). He also confuses ideality with
reality. So for me Fukuyama is wrong. The assessment of Peter Scholl-Latour,
Fukuyama's thesis has been absurd since its beginning (**|**),
is right, I think.
I define history as a cultural evolution.
All archivable artifacts belong to history. So e.g.
padded dinosaurs in a museum belong to history because they are
archived artifacts, although dinosaurs themselves belong to eveolution-without-history
because they did not archive artifacts, they did not
have any history. Even human beings had not had any history
for the most time of their existence. But they have been having
story (here story means only telling story,
told story, etc.) since they began to speak. So story
as a oral tradition (tale and so on) does not
belong to history.
Do you agree with that definition? If yes, then we can think about
the Eloi as an example for humans without history
in the future, can't we? The question is not, whether humans
will have story in their future or not, but the question
is, whether humans will have history in their future or not.
Why am I saying that? Because we should not confuse history
with any development, for example with the natural development or
with the natural evolution. History is cultural evolution. Archivable
artifacts belong to history, and history belongs to evolution, and
evolution belongs to development in nature. So history is embedded
in evolution and in natural development, while evolution is only
embedded in natural development. All events are based on natural
(physico-chemical) development. Evolution is based on natural (physico-chemical)
development. History is based on natural (physico-chemical) development
and on (biological) evolution, history is defined as a cultural
evolution. Story - as I define it (cp. above) - is also defined
as a cultural evolution, but in contrast to history story contains
no archivable artifact (except all kinds of an engineered story
like an audiotape and so on). Story in this text and context means
merely oral tales or oral narratives - not more.
So if we are asking whether history ended or not, ends or
not, will end or will not, then we are always asking, whether cultural
evolution ended or not, ends or not, will end or will not, whether
the relation between human beings and archivable artifacts
ended or not, ends or not, will end or will not.
The house of change:
| History |
|___ Evolution ___|
|______ Development ______|
|_____________ Change _____________|
Non-human-beings know traces as a kind of information -
but nothing about traces as a linguistical and philosophical
meaning. Trace is a word, a concept, a term, a definition
only for human beings. Non-human-beings can not tell you
what traces are because they have no human language. Non-human-beings
have no story because they have no human language in order to tell
a story like human beings do, and they also have no writing language
in order to wirte and to archive artifacts historically like human
beings have been doing for at least 6000 years.
One needs a human language in order to have stories, and one needs
a human writing (script) language in order to have history. Great
war - as an eaxmple for an historical existential (**|**)
- can merely be defined as great war, if there is already
history. If there is no history, there would be no great war; but
even then, if it were possible, the event of a great war
could not be identified as a great war and therefore would not be
defined as a such. It depends on semantics, thus on language, especially
on semantics of the writing language because the writing
language is the pre-condition for history. And if there is
no writing language, there will be no history. And
also: If there is nobody left to understand what writing is and
what history is, there will be no history - even then, if there
are artifacts, because they are hence no artifacts anymore
because nobody knows what artifacts are.
So, if that scenario will come true, human beings will merely be
what they had been before they started with writing and - consequently
- with history. They will not know what human beings are, although
they will still be human beings, just like their ancestors who did
not know what human beings are, although they were already human
beings. The word human being with all its semantics
is a creation by human beings with writing language and history.
According to Oswald Spengler the West has been consisting religiously
of catholics and protestants, thus without all (all!) orthodox Christians.
Greeks, Slavs, and other orthodox Christians have never been belonging
to the Western culture / civilisation. They all have been getting
influenced by the West - like the other people of the world as well
-, but never been becoming a real part of the West.
Spengler assumed that there will be either no new culture
anymore or perhaps one: a Russian one. But Spengler tended
more to the conviction that no new culture will come, thus:
the Western culture / civilisation ist the last one.
The demographic development is one of the most importanrt historical
existentials.
If a culture does not have enough children to rejuvenate itself,
then the history of this culture ends. And if this culture has already
become the culture of all human beings, then the history of all
human beings ends.
According to the German cultural philosopher Oswald A. G. Spengler
we know 8 historical cultures, according to the English cultural
philosopher Arnold J. Toynbee we know 19 historical cultures. I
think Spenglers theory of 8 historical cultures is right. Currently
we have 4 dead historical cultures and 4 historical
cultures which are still alive. Maybe there will come
a new one (perhaps Russia, Spengler said), but we do not know,
and we also do not know whether the one and only
culture has really existed and whether the one and only culture
will exist. Institutions like World Bank, IWF, United Nations, ...
and so on ... do not mean one culture. The fact that only
one culture - the Faustian culture (also called: Western culture)
- was able to discover, conquer, capture the whole planet Earth
and in addition other parts of the universe is also no proof for
the existence of one culture, a so called universal culture.
An universal culture is merely an ideology, a new-religion.
If there will be merely one culture of the human beings, then all
historical cultures of the human beings will have to be eliminated.
But today the 4 historical cultures of the human beings are still
alive.
But if that one culture as the universal culture
will come, then the history will probably be eliminated.
Hear what rulers and their politicians have been preaching since
1989: One world, one civilisation (culture), one religion,
one financial system of course, one economy, one language, one media,
one science, one technology, one ecology, one art, one city (no
country), one sex / gender, one state (or no state), one education,
one rule (leadership); and no nobility, no class, no state (or one
state), no great war, no country. That means: No history!
Capitalism as the thesis (cp. Hegel) and communism as the antithesis
(cp. Hegel) are now integrated in the Globalism as the synthesis
(cp. Hegel). It is important to find the new antithesis (cp. Hegel)
to the new thesis (cp. Hegel) which is set by the Globalism as the
synthesis (cp. Hegel). What could that new antithesis (cp. Hegel)
be?
If there will be no new antithesis (cp. Hegel), then that new thesis
(cp. Hegel) will probably be the eternal thesis as the
so called universal culture / civilisation of the Last
Men and the end of history.
The post-modern era is not really a post-modern era,
but merely a late-modern era. The postmodern era will come later,
maybe even in this centrury or later. Why am I saying this? I think
that the postmodern era will be very much similar to the era
after the end of history, perhaps it's a prestage or even the
same stage, and this era (postmodern and/or era after the end
of history) will, if it really will come, be an eternal
era of the Last Men.
The late-modern era leads to the postmodern era, and in the late-modern
era you can already notice the increasing of e.g. gang systems (cp.
late-modern) which lead to feudal systems (postmodern).
Good will be evil, and evil
will be good. Truth will be lie,
and lie will be truth. War will
be peace, and peace will be war
.... And so on.
Partly it has already been realised, and it will be completely
realised. That's not new, and it appears again and again.
Both capitalistic system and socialistic system are not able to
afford what is needed for them. The capitalistic systsem has always
to fear the socialistic system, and the socialistic system can not
exist without the capitalistic system. It's Hegel's Dialektik.
So this is merely possible with a Synthesis of both
capitalism as Thesis and socialism as Antithesis.
There is no other solution in order to manage that -
as long as history lasts.
We live in an age of globalism which is a system of both capitalism
and socialism.
Humans had had their very, very long time without any history,
so it is also possible that in the future humans will again have
no history, and therefor the androids will help them very much.
If humans destroy themselves, then it means the end of human evolution:
If humans destroy history or historical existentials / historical
cultures, then it means the end of history.
Perhaps the humans only start to destroy and the machines will
bring it to the end and destroy all humans: the end of human evolution.
Perhaps the humans only start to destroy and the machines will fail,
so that some humans will survive without any history: the end of
history.
The end of history can but does not necessarily mean the
end of development, the end of nature, the end
of evolution or the end of planet Earth ... and so on.
Look at the house of change again:
| History |
|___ Evolution ___|
|______ Development ______|
|_____________ Change _____________|
History, evolution, development are change, but change is not always
development or evolution or history, and development is not always
evolution or history, and evolution is not always history. So history
is conceptually embedded in evolution, both are conceptually embedded
in development, and this three are conceptually embedded in change
, but change is conceptually not embedded in anything at all, it
seems to be an universal. Howsoever, the hypernym of history,
evolution anddevelopment is change.
Change is measured by time, the other three can also be measured
by time but not as a whole, because they are not only characterized
by change but also by their own properties and features (each of
them has the more of them the more it goes into the direction of
history, so history has the most properties and features, especially
the historical existentials [**]).
The end of history means the end of historical existentials.
This historical existentials are about 6000 years old. So,
human history (not human evolution) is also about 6000 years
old.
The end of development at all includes necessarily both
the end of evolution and the end of history; the end
of evolution includes necessarily the end of history;
but the end of history does not include the end of development
or the end of evolution.
So the end of all human beings includes the end
of history, because the end of all human beings means the end
of the human evolution (which includes - of course - the end
of history). History, as far as we know, is merely a human history
or just a history of those humans who make and/or are involved in
human history.
According to Spengler the Zivilisation is a late part
of the Kultur, and in the West this part began in the
end of the 18th century or the beginning of the 19th century (b.t.w.:
this is also the time when, according to Hegel, the history perhaps
ended - but that is not important for the understanding of Spengler's
theory), and leads into a more and more non-historical time, a cultural
/ civilisational winter, a kind of senility. The West
(Abendland = Eveningland) will reach this
time of cultural / civilisational winter in the 21st,
or the 22nd, or the 23rd century, approximately in the year 2200.
When this time will be reached it will be possible that the end
of history will also be reached because there will probably be no
new Kultur anymore.
According to Hegel's Dialektik there has to be a Synthesis
of the Thesis capitalism (especially successful in the
19th century) and the Antithesis communism (especially
successful in the 20th century). What kind of Synthesis can it be?
Merely something like globalism or its contrary: localism / regionalism
which will lead to the pre-historical times resembling post-historical
times.
If the new world order is really as ideologically
necessary in today's world (**),
then this new world order can merely be - llike I said - something
like globalism or its contrary: localism / regionalism, which will
lead to the pre-historical times resembling post-historical
times.
The Hundred Years War of ideological conflict
(**) was the
epoch where egalitarianism (socialism, communism etc.) were stronger
than liberalism (capitalism etc.) because it had undercut and threatened
all liberalistic (capitalistic) systems. But now we are living in
a different epoch: capitalism is weak, communism is not as strong
as in the last epoch, and globalism - as the Synthesis of capitalism
and communism (cp. Hegel's Dialektik) - is the strongest.
That means that both capitalism and communism still exist, but as
a mix in which capitalism dominates as a communism.
Referring to the fact that globalism is a Synthesis of capitalism
(Thesis) and communism (Antithesis) the end of history will
be reached when this Synthesis has changed to such a New Thesis
whithout any historical existence. Merely something like globalism
or its contrary: localism / regionalism, which will lead to the
pre-historical times resembling post-historical times.
According to Huntington history will not end in the next time because
there will be a clash of civilisations (cultures); according to
Fukuyama history will end because the occidental civilisation (culture)
has won.
Please look at the following pictures:


Now please imagine, there is not a spiralic, but merely a cyclic
way. What do you see and think then? I guess you see
and think that there is an action replay, an iteration, a recurrence,
a reapeat, a repetition, a rerun ... and so on. That's the relation
to the cyclicity - in any case (for example: physical, chemical,
biological, economical, semiotical [incl. pscholgical/sociological],
lingustical, philosophical, mathematical]). And now please imagine,
there is not merely a cyclic, but also a spiralic way
- then, of course, the cyclic way becomes a more relativised
cyclic way, but that doesn't matter, because it is just
an impression. I think that devolopment (incl. evolution and history)
is certainly a spiral-cyclic way which merely perhaps
follows the time arrow - the former and not the latter is important
for my theory.
The house of change:
| History |
|___ Evolution ___|
|______ Development ______|
|_____________ Change _____________|
History is merely the roof of the house of change.
Time and the house of change:
| History |
|___ Evolution ___|
|______ Development ______|
|_____________ Change _____________|
------------------------------------------------------------------------
_____________________ Time ______________________
History is merely the roof of the house of change.
So: History is always part of the evolution, of development, of
the change; and evolution is always part of development, of change;
and development is always part of change; but change can be, but
does not have to be development, evolution or history; development
can, but does not have to be evolutuion or history; and evolution
can, but does not haves to be history.
Change > Development > Evolution > History.
You probably know the meaning of hyperonym (superordination)
and hyponym (subordination). My interpetation
of change, development, evolution,
history in their structural relations to each other
is the following one:
1) Change is the hyperonym of the hyponyms
development, evolution and history.
1,1) Development is a hyponym of the hyperonym
change and the hyperonym of the hyponyms evolution
and history.
1,1,1) Evolution is a hyponym of the hyperonyms
change and development and the hyperonym
of the hyponym history.
1,1,1,1) History is merely a hyponym,
namely of the hyperonyms change, development
and evolution.
That consequently means: if history ends, evolution or development
or even change do not have to end simultaneously; and if evolution
ends, history ends simultaneously, but development and change do
not have to end simultaneously; and if development ends, evolution
and history end simultaneously, but change does not have to end
simultaneously. So in that relation merely change is independent.
Development depends only on change. Evolution depends on change
and development. History is the most dependent, because it depends
on change, development, and evolution.
You may compare (1) change with our universe in time, (1,1) development
with our sun, our planet, or our moon ... etc., (1,1,1) evolution
with a living being (for example an alga, or a snake, or a human
being without history ... etc., and (1,1,1,1) history with
a - of course - historical human being.
They all belong to 1 (change), and merely historical
human beings belong to 1,1,1,1 (history).
The history of cultures (civilisations) is also a spiral-cyclic
move - psychologically (I prefer the word semiotically) cognizable,
because cultures have something like a soul or psyche ans their
own original symbolics.
History conceptually depends on evolution, development, change;
evolution conceptually depends on development and change; development
conceptually merely depends on change. So change is probably eternal
because it is universal or cosmic; but development, evolution and
a fortiori history are not eternal - they can end.
An analogy:
| Culture-Nature |
|_______ Culture _______|
|_________ Nature-Culture _________|
|_________________ Nature __________________|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
______________________________ Time _______________________________
So nature (compare: physics and chemistry) is probably eternal
because it is universal or cosmic; but nature-culture (compare:
biology and ecology/economy), culture (compare: seniotics and linguistics)
and a fortiori culture-nature (compare: philosophy and mathematics)
are not eternal - they can end (because neurons, brains, extensive
and complex brains, mind, especially in a sense of Geist,
are needed). Unfortunately most of the scientists and even philosophers
neglect the latter, although it is the highest level. In the case
of scientists, it does not surprise me, because they have, especially
at present, the task to serve the rulers. But in the case of the
philosophers, it surprises me a bit. If humans really were free
(they are not!), they would not neglect the culture-nature (compare:
philosophy and mathematics) because they would more try to transport
it in reality and in their everyday life.
If there is no awareness of change, then no development can be
observed; if development can not be observed, then evolution can
also not be observed; if evolution can not be observed, then history
can also not be observed. Backwards: If history can be observed,
then evolution, development and change can also be observed; if
evolution can be observed, then development and change can also
be observed; if development can be observed, then change can also
be observed.
What does that mean?
Space and time are probably eternal, so nature and change
are probably eternal. Our capability of observing nature
and change depends on space and time on the objective side and on
our senses and brains on the subjective side. Without these preconditions
we would not exist; so there would also not be any human answer
to the question why space and time can also be observed and interpreted
as nature and change, as nature-culture and development, as culture
and evolution, as culture-nature and history. So if there is not
only nature but also nature-culture (trannsition between nature
and culture), culture and culture-nature (trannsition between culture
and nature), then it is possible to find change in all four realms
and to find nature in all four kinds of events.
If history is lost but human development not lost, then you can
see the real Eloi or the renaissance of the Stone Age
life.
If the sense of history will be lost, then it will make no sense
to have history at all, because there will be no one who knows anything
about both the sense of history and the history itself. There will
be no historian, no one who knows what history and ist sense is,
probably even no one with a sense for the meaning of the past for
both the present and the future.
If history will totally become also a part of a modern ideology
like any other cultural phenomeneon, then it will be merely part
of a religious system, although a modern one, and no longer be its
own system - provided that some other historical existentials (**|**)
will also be lost -, so the ideological (modern religious) system
and its language (media) will be able then to sweep
history under the ideological (modern religious) carpet
and afterwards nnihilate it. That will be done, if the chance will
be there - certainly. We have been seing this bad development because
it has been becoming more and more obvious. Interestingly it has
been having a correlation with the modern development of the machines
(**|**|**)
and all the other modern developments. Thus: amongst others the
machines are strongly involved in that process.
There are quite a few signs that suggest that states will disappear.
I have already spoken of these signs. States are indeed amongst
the historical existentials (**|**).
Globalism, super organisations, organisations like UNO, nongovernmental
organisations (NGOs), and many other organisations and institutions
replace the national states - that is already obvious -, and will
replace states at all.
If there will not come up a new culture, which is not global, then
the history will probably end. The globalists will bring the last
historical epoch - the globalistic epoch - to its end.
A globalist trend necessitates the end of history of a culture
(in this case: the Western culture) via civilisation of that culture,
and the last epoch or phase with history in this sense is always
globalistic. In the case of the Western (Occidental) culture it
even refers to the whole globe because the Westerners have discovered
and captured the whole planet Earth - and even more of the solar
system. I don't see another culture which will be able to be born
soon. So this time it is possible that there will be
no culture anymore, which means there will be only cosmic developments
and evolution but no history. That trend is cognoscible.
So, not the globalist trend itself necessitates the end of history,
but the life of a culture, and the globalism is merely
a phase of a culture, a globalistic phase of a culture, the last
historical phase of a culture.
Liberal democracy is merely one of the (last) Western
forms of governement. All liberal democracies content
an antagonism, a contradiction, similiar to all liberal equalities
or all capitalistic socialisms. And liberality without
democracy or democracy without liberality are one of the worst forms
of society or government because they serve the purpose of exploitation
and are not of long duration.
It is difficult to justify that the liberal democracy ...
is ... the West's penultimate representative form. It is not
so difficult to justify that the liberal democracy could be the
Wests last representative form. But is it also right? I don't
think so.
History is a kind of development, although it will perhaps end,
and then there will merely be cosmic development and evolution but
no history. So the human life will then be like animal
life again.
If (1.) the global phase of a culture will have reached its end
and (2.) there will be no other culture, especially a young culture
(and currently there isn't any), then history will end. Note: Global
culture is (represented by) the Western culture, especially
its modern times, but the Western culture has not yet reached its
end. I think we have to wait, so the times will become even worse,
and I dont know when the time for better forms will come,
because anything and everything on this planet Earth (and in addition
already other parts of our solar system) depend on this global culture,
the Western culture. That doesn't mean that every Westerner is somehow
guilty, but the upper class is guilty, and this upper
class is everywhere, not only in Western countries. There is no
real resistance, and there will not be any real resistance because
of the lack of a young culture. Nearly all human beings have been
becoming Westerners, tributaries of the Western globalists (note:
in this case of the globalists Western doesn't always
mean that they are original Westerners, but they are Westerners
because of the fact that they are globalists, and globalists are
a product of the Western culture).
Terms like change of evolution or development
of history are tautogical, because evolution
(as well as development and history) is always a change, history
(as well as evolution) is always a development. History is a kind
of evolution (namely a cultural one), a kind of development,
a kind of change. It is the roof of the house
of change (**|**|**).
Do you know how powerful the rulers of this globe already are?
Maybe, if history will end, the humans will have to start where
our ancestors once stopped (about 6000 years ago, when history started).
Or maybe, if history ends, the humans will feel happy in the dictatorship
of the machines.
Or maybe, if history ends, the human evolution will also end.
The forms of history repeat till the point in time when it ends,
if it ends at all.
It is normal, typical for humans and their cultures to forget their
technologies. For example: the technologies of the Mesopotamian
culture, of the Egyptian culture, of the Apollinic (Greek/Roman)
culture, and of the American (Maya/Inca) culture were forgotten
after the death of this cultures. So I predict that
the technologies of the Occidental culture will be forgotten after
the death of the Occidental culture. Relating to the
forgetfulness, it makes only a little difference that the Occidental
culture is the only one which has conquered and captured the whole
globe and parts of the universe.
On average it is posible that it takes merely three or four generations,
until cultural affairs are forgotten, if nothing is done against
that forgetful development. You don't believe that? Remember the
Roman history. When the Germans conquered Rome and the Roman territory
the Romans had already forgotten many of their own technologies.
Or remember the Aztecan history. When the Spanish conquered the
Aztecan territory the Atztecs had already forgotten how to build
their pyramids.
If there were no time, then you would not be able to measure any
change. Change can only be measured by time and be represented also
as development (the most cases), or evolution (many cases) and history
(few cases). What I make is a kind of linguistic classification.
If you don't know which change is meant - change itself (100%) or
development or evolution or history -, you should just say change,
because it is a superordinated word.
When some people talk about nature or about universe
and time, they don't make any difference and say for example
»history« of the nature, »history«
of the universe, ... and so on, or »evolution«
of the nature, »evolution« of the
universe, ... and so on. Thats not necessarily wrong,
but to me the adequate word for the describing of the natural
or universal change - thus as a general meaning
- is the word change itself, whereas the words development,
evolution and history should merely be used
in special cases.
I say that history will perhaps end in the relatively near future.
We have an effect on the way of the future progresses, but who
is we? The main effect comes frome about 1% of all humans,
the effect of about 19-20% of all humans is still considerable,
but the effect of about 79-80% of all humans is quite inconsiderable.
The latter do what the former want them to do. Basical is the effect
of the 1% of all humans, regardless wether the form of government
is monarchy/tyrannis, aristocracy/oligarchy, or democracy/ochlocracy.
Who decided, decide, and will decide wether or not there is war,
for example? 1% of all humans! The other humans (99%) can not change
very much. And if there will be no war, no historical existentials
(**|**),
no history anymore, then that will probably be the time of the last
men (letzter Mensch - Friedrich W. Nietzsche).
What should the historian do? If the historian wanted to change
something according to his feelings (for example), this historian
would not be a real historian. Historians have to know and fix the
hoistorical facts without any feelings and disturbance which comes
from outside their bodies.
The reasons why beliefs, thoughts, theories, metaphysical ontologies,
philosophies of physics are different refers to the difference of
cultures. Two examples of that much different that they are antipodes
are the Apollonian culture and the Faustian culture.
The humans of the Apollonian Culture always interpret physical
bodies staticallly, the humans of the Faustian culture
dynamically. So it is no wonder that in the Faustian culture
a Faust came to the idea to interpret the dynamics
(and no longer the rest position, the statics) as the normal
state of a physical body and to postulate forces as the
cause of this dynamics.
Newtons physcal theory is one of these Faustian physical theories,
although there had been many more Faustian physical theories before
Newton, especially those of Johann(es; Georg) Faust himself, or
of Galileo Galilei, or of Johannes Kepler, and also after Newton.
History has not ended yet, although it seems to sink, to go down,
to decline, to shrink.
History cant have ended yet because the historical
existentials (**|**)
havent ended.
There is no doubt that some of those examples
of historical existentials have been shrinking, while other historical
existentials have been expanding.
Since
the beginning of the Western modern times:
|
1. |
Religion
has been becoming a more secular religion, a modern religion,
thus an ideology; so religion has been expanding. |
2. |
Rule (leadership,
a.s.o.) has been becoming a more hidden, secret, esoteric
one; so rule has been expanding. |
3. |
Nobleness (nobility,
a.s.o.) has also been becoming a more hidden, secret, esoteric
one; so nobleness has been expanding. |
4. |
Classes have
been changing: a richer becoming upper class, a shrinking middle
class, an increasing lower class; so classes have been changing
badly. |
5. |
State
has been becoming a more and more powerless institution; so
the state has been shrinking, and probably it will disappear.
**
** |
6. |
Great war has
been becoming smaller but much more wars and threatening; so
we still can't say much about the end of this historical existential. |
7. |
City
and country as contrast have been changing by expanding
cities and shrinking countries; so the contrast will perhaps
disappear. |
8. |
Education,
especially in schools and universities, has been becoming
a catastrophic issue; so education has been changing very badly. |
9. |
Science
has been becoming a new religion for the most part; so science
has been changing very badly. |
10. |
Order
of sexulality / demographics, economics has been becoming
a catastrophic issue too; so this order has been becoming a
disorder. |
11. |
Historiography
/ awareness of history has been getting under ideological
(modern religious) control; so historography has been changing
badly! **
** |
So the historical existentials state (=>
5.), city and country as contrast (=>
7.), education, especially in schools and universities (=>
8.), science (=> 9.), order
of sexulality / demographics, economics (=>
10.), and last but not least historiography / awareness of
history (=> 11.) will probably disappear
during the next future, provided that humans will be alive then.
But we still dont know whether the historical existentials
religion (=> 1.), rule (=> 2.), nobleness (=> 3.), classes
(=> 4.), graet war (=> 6.) will end as long as humans are
alive.
A modern society is velociferic (comes from: velozifersich
- Goethe), accelerated in any case, expanded in any case, greedy
in any case, too fat, too ugly ....
The hubris seems to be unstoppable. Its a veloficeric
development.
Newton was a scientist and theologian while his German Zeitgenosse
(time accomplice, coeval, contemporary) Leibniz was
a scientist and philosopher; so theology and philosophy make
the crucial difference. Newton had political power, Leibniz had
no political power. Calculus was invented by Leibniz. Wether calculus
was also, simultaneously and independently of Leibniz, invented
by Newton too is doubtable because of Newtons political power.
Goethe ... war in seiner ganzen Denkweise, ohne es zu wissen,
ein Schüler von Leibniz gewesen. (Oswald Spengler, Der
Untergang des Abendlandes, 1918, S. IX **).
Translation:
Goethe ... had been in his whole way of thinking, without
knowing it, a disciple of Leibniz.
What has been found and brought in a formula by Newton could also
have been found and brought in a formula by another person. It was
Newton's political power that made him and his laws
famous. If he hadn't had this political power, he and his laws
would probably not have become famous. The history of Western science
would have remained a Faustian one anyway but been written in a
different way and probably never mentioned Newton. The history of
Western science would have remained a Faustian one anyway but been
written in a different way and probably never mentioned Newton.
So without any doubt, Newton was also a Faustian scientist but he
gave a very special form to the Faustian science. And what I just
said about Newton, applies similarly for Einstein. So Newton and
Einstein are not the most typical Faustian scientists but nevertheless
also Faustian scientists. Their relativity theories are not as absolute
and dynamic as other Faustian theories but nevertheless also Faustian
theories.
The other Faustian theories are all the other Occidental (Western)
theories. They are so many that I didn't want to list them in my
last post. In this case, it doesn't matter wether they are
right (true) or wrong (false)
because in this case it is crucial and essential wether they
belong to the type, the form, the character of the Faustian culture,
for example: dynamic, infinity, infiniteness, endlessness, everlastingness,
boundlessness, illimitableness, force(s), dilatation, expansiveness,
... and so on.
The Non-Faustian cultures had and have a completely different
idea when it comes to undertand what nature, physics,
universe, life, ... means. Humans at different
places and times understood, understand, and will understand their
environment differently, they even have their own worlds,
and so they also value and justify differently. If you know how
science was and/or is understood by the Mesopotamian
culture, by the Egyptian culture, by the Indian (or
South-Asian) culture, by the Chinese (or East-Asian) culture,
by the Apollonian culture (our ancestor), by the Inka/Maya
culture, by the Magic/Arabian/Islamic culture, and the Faustian
culture (the descendant of the Apollinian culture), then you know
also the differences in their theories and even their philosophies
(metaphysics, ontologies, ...). Merely the Faustian culture has
developed a real science; partly ,and merely partly also the other
cultures, partly because they had and have (a)
a too hot climate, (b) a too dominant
religion, so that something which could be called science
nearly remained or remains a religion, or (c)
other conditions that prevented or prevent the developmet of a real
science.
You may say (for example): there were the constructions of
the Tower of Babel, the pyramids of the Egyptians and the Maya,
the inventions and discoveries of the Mesopotamian culture, the
Chinese (East-Asian) culture, the Apollonian culture (our ancestor).
Alright, but they weren't like that what the Faustian constructions,
inventions, and discoveries were and are. Merely the Faustian culture
had and has a concept of an autonomous science and technique/technology.
You may see what it means to have a more religious science
and technique/technology when you look at thre current
Faustian science which is again more dominated by religion
than in former times of the Faustian culture, for example the era
of the so-called enlightenment (Aufklärung).
It is comparable to humans personal development: the most scientific
time is the time of the adolescence and around the adolescence;
the era of the enlightenment (Aufklärung)
was such a time for the Faustian culture. A younger one is
too unripe, an older one is already too ripe
- for example too conservative, too philosophical,
thus too wise - for science as an enlightenment
(Aufklärung), but not too ripe for a more
religious or philosophical (metaphysical, ontological) science.
Did anyone of the other cultures invent theories of relativity,
gravitational force, electromagnetic force,
strong nuclear force, weak nuclear force,
speed of light, thermodynamics, quantum,
big bang, inflation of the universe, black
holes, dark matter, dark energy, ....?
That has not merely to do with the different times when those cultures
had their best time in order to invent and form something like science
and its theories. The Non-Faustian cultures invented theories
for their religion, theology, philosophy, or just their states;
they had not a really autonomous (system of) science, no universities
(universities are invented by the Faustians, they are a pure Faustian
form, institution). The scientists of the Non-Faustian
cultures researched at home and the most of them also studied at
home. If you now think of the library of Alexandria, then I have
to remind you that it was no university in a Faustian sense.
My point is not that the theories of the Non-Faustians were
not useful at all; my point is that they were not scientific (just
in a Faustian sense). In the good old times of the Faustian science
one could relatively freely study and research because the universities
were relatively free then, and this was not possible in other cultures.
So the university system, the unit of studies and research, and
especially the relative freedom of all universities are unique,
and abbeys and cloisters are their forerunners. Monks, namely Occidental
(Faustian) monks, were the cultural ancestors of the students of
the universities.
In Mesopotamia, especially in Egypt and China, not seldom also
in orther cultures (except the Apollonian and the Faustian culture
which are related), scientists or technicians were killed
after important inventions or discoveries they had made. There was
no scientific system, all that what we - the Faustians - call science
lacked there, especially the relative freedom, the unit of studies
and research. The universities as a system of science, thus of real
science, is unique, is Faustian.
The current development of science shows whereto it tends: probably
it will not vanish but become a new religion. Science came
out of religion and will end as a new religion. The future scientists
will probably be similar to the monks of the so-called Middle
Ages but only a bit similar because their relative
freedom will probably decrease but not vanish as long as the Faustian
culture will exist.
That is my firm conviction.
You have to know Goethes Faust,
especially the second part (but also the first part), in order to
understand what is meant with Faustian culture and why
all the other cultures are no specific or at least not as much science
cultures as the Faustian culture is a science culture. But the Faustian
culture is not only a science culture but just a Faustian culture,
and as one of the most important parts it includes the part science.
In any case, one has to read Goethes Faust or
Spenglers Decline of the West when it comes to
really and well understand what Faustian culture means.
The absolute, categorical will to knowledge is probably the
most important example if one wants to know the impulse of Faust
and the Faustians.
The other cultures are more religious, but not very much, except
one which is the most religiuos of all cultures: the Magic/Arabian/Islamic
culture; all so-called monotheisms" have their origin
in this culture because in the territory of that culture are a lot
of deserts, and the monotheistic religions have much to do with
deserts.
Religion belongs to culture, so each culture is religious, more
or less. For example: the Magic/Arabian/Islamic culture is the most
religious culture, the Faustian culture is the most scientific culture.
It is no coincidence or accident that the Faustian culture invented
and discovered so much, and the consequences which can clearly be
seen are the pollution of the planet Earth and its neighborhood,
the unresponsible politics, the bad conscience, the hypocrisy, the
lies, and as the next goal: the new religion. Science is Faustian
science and nothing else, and one can easily guess what it means
when it becomes a new religion.
Goethe has not only described the typical Western man with
his Faust, but also predicted the future of the
Western man.
In the near end of Goethes Faust, part II, an
angel says to Faust:
Wer immer strebend sich bemüht, // Den
können wir erlösen.
(Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust, Teil II, S. 376.)
Translation:
Who strives always to the utmost, // For him there is salvation.
And amongst others this is what the Chorus mysticus
sings when Faust is in heaven at last (... fortunately!):
Alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichnis.
(Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust, Teil II, S. 383.)
Translation:
All perishable is only an allegory.
that the state has been becoming a more and more powerless Institution;
so the state has been shrinking, and probably it will disappear
(**|**|**).
The great cultures are city cultures, and world history is city
history and megacity history.
Globally the cities are rising, not declinig, not yet. In the year
2007 the global city poulation reached the mark of 50% (for comparison:
1950 it was 30%, and 2050 it will probably be 70%). But most cities
of the Occidental culture are declining.

That is is very depressing. The future looks bleak.
Peter Sloterdijk wrote in his diary on the 11th of May 2009:
Woran würde man das Ende der Geschichte erkennen? Vielleicht
am Aufhören der Sorge.
- Peter Sloterdijk, Zeilen und Tage, 2012, S. 197.
Translation:
By what would one recognise the end of the history?
Perhaps by the cessation of the care.
I hope I translated the German word Sorge correctly
because philosophically it is a bit difficult to translate: Sorge
means care, concern, trouble,
anxiety, worry, solicitude,
sorrow, ... and so on. The words besorgen
(verb), versorgen (verb), Vorsorge (noun),
umsorgen (verb), fürsorgen (verb),
Fürsorge (noun), ... and many others are derived
from the words Sorge (noun) and sorgen (verb),
and this has not only a special meaning in the German language but
also in the German philosophy - since Heidegger also in the worldwide
philosophy.
So we have i.e. the nouns care, concern,
trouble, anxiety, worry, solicitude,
sorrow, forhandedness, precaution,
prevention, aid, ministration,
providence, provision, welfare,
relief, supplying, ..., and many others
and i.e. the verbs , to (take) care, to prevent,
to provide (for), to look (ahead), to
attend (to), to obtain, to procure,
to secure, to find (something), to
fix (someone) up (with something), to look (after),
to supply, to accomodate (someone with something),
to shepherd (soemone), ..., and many others. No one
of that words really means to 100% what one of the words Sorge
(noun), sorgen (verb), besorgen (verb),
versorgen (verb), Vorsorge (noun), umsorgen
(verb), fürsorgen (verb), Fürsorge
(noun) means.
In the case above the word care fits the most, I think.
I am pretty sure that Sloterdijk really meant his words like I translated
them.
If the cessation of the care is a sign of the end of history, then
the end of history is not far away any more.
This so-called Eurovision song contest is merely one
part of the stupidest Eurodecadent horror show.
Can we slow down the modern velocity? **
The modernity seems to be a the accelerated
mobilisation, the accelerated change, the accelerated time. Johann
Wolfgang von Goethe called the modern velocity das Veloziferische
which is composed of the first four letters of thje Latin noun velocitas
(speed, hurry, rush) and the
last five letters of the German noun Luzifer (Lucifer)
respectively the last four letters of the German adjective luziferisch
(luciferic, luciferious) and with an e
because that adjective is nominalized to the neuter noun Veloziferisches
(with the neuter article: das Veloziferische).
Remember the stupid sentence of Karl Marx: Die Philosophen
haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert; es kommt drauf an,
sie zu verändern. (The philosophers have
only interpreted the world in various ways; the point however is
to change it.) I say (with Peter Sloterdijk): Die
Philosophen haben die Welt immer nur verschieden verändert;
es kommt drauf an, sie zu schonen. (The philosophers
have only changed the world in various ways; the point however is
to save [conserve] ]it.)
Since the beginning of the industrialisation by the steam engine
there was a resistance against it. At first in England, then in
Germany, and later in other European countries and in the United
States of America too.
Lets think about Luddism, Neo-Luddism, and Neo-Neo-Luddism?
Named after Ned Ludd, a youth who allegedly smashed two stocking frames
in 1779, and whose name had become emblematic of machine destroyers.
Ned Ludd was allegedly called General Ludd or King Ludd, a figure
who, like Robin Hood, was reputed to live in Sherwood Forest.
But is Luddism, Neo-Luddism, and Neo-Neo-Luddism
a solution?
Perhaps (!) the humans will be so stupid that they will dont
know or have forgotten how machines work and slow down the modern
velocity; and then it will depend on the developmental stage of
the machines intelligence whether they will be able to accelerate
the velocity again or slow it down, and whether they will keep the
humans alive or not.
Small parts in Amazonia, Central Africa, Papua New Guinea and a
small part of the aborigines in Australia will probably be the places
where humans wil survive the global holocaust; and due to the fact
that these places are really small parts and the human groups are
small groups, the probability that these human groups will survive
is even higher.
If their jungles will not completely be cut down, then they will
probably have the best chances to survive the global holocaust.
Did you know that Huntington was Fukuyama's teacher at Havard?
Did the history essentially end with Hegel, especially with his
1807 published work Phänomenologie des Geistes?
Dissatisfied people don't want the end of history, because they
always invent victims like the workers as the proletariat,
the women, the homosexuals (gays, lesbians, transsexuals),
the underclass, the blacks, the non-whites, the immigrants, the
maniacs, the non-smokers, the children, the body, the animals, the
plants, the environment, the planet Earth, and so on. But is this
historically really significant / meaningful?
When it comes to understand the end of history in the
Hegelian sense, one has to know what Hegel exactly meant by Staat
(state), especially by Rechtsstaat (constitutional
state, state of law), by Geist, especially
by absoluter Geist (absolute spirit [but
unfortunately Geist is not perfectly translatable]),
and, of course, by Geschichte (history),
and by some or many more words and concepts.
Nobody, thus also no philosopher, can really be sure of the term
end of history, because the definitions of history
are unfortunately too many and too different. Therefore it is worth
to talk about it philosophically in order to find something like
an universal definition, but I think that exactly that is not possible.
We do not know for sure how history and historicality
can be exactly defined. Can they be defined by e.g. existence philosophy?
Should we at first try to define what historical existence
is?
Probably we have to wait before we judge. Maybe there will be a
great war because of e.g. Israel. A great war definitely means history.
I can't really believe that history in the narrower sense has ended.
According to the fact that I am merely asking whether history has
ended or not I can say that in some cases is has and in other cases
it has not ended. So the conclusiobn is that histoy has probably
not ended.
Cyborgs are such a fundamental change that I would say that such
a development is more evolutionarily than historically significant,
and this does not mean that it is not historically significant.
History is not dead. At least: Not yet.
Philosophically said, the Marxistic communism, which is based on
Hegel's dialectic, says that the capitalism is the thesis,
the dictatorship of the proletariat is the antithesis, and
classless equality and equal happiness for all is the synthesis.
But if it is right that history is class struggle (war), then it
is not - or at least only without history - possible to get a classless
equality and equal happiness for all. Okay, Hegel already claimed
the end of history (**|**),
also Marx who was a Left-Hegelian, and many others (mostly Hegelians,
some Nietzscheans, some others). So, as long as there is history
there is no classless equality and equal happiness for all, so that
the classes, the inequality, thus the class struggles (war) remain.
The conclusion must be either (a) the trial to finish history or
(b) the search for other solutions. Ending history is theoretically
possible. Maybe the machines, the genetic engineering, and the cyborgization
will lead us to the capability of ending history practically in
the future. At the moment there is more war than ever before.
Those modern guys who say religion is opium for
the people want to give them their religion, a modern religion
(examples: liberalism, egalitarianism/communism,
fascism, humanitarianism/globalism),
which has always to do with the elimination of the old religion
and with antitheism (with slogans like religion is opium for
the people, God is an impossibility ...). The
main problem ist that the new, the modern religion is
even worse than the old one.
Do not buy the modern opium!
Tiernan Morgan and Lauren Purje wrote:
Hegels ... teleological understanding of history
served as a useful template for Dantos conclusions. Hegel
understood progress as an overarching dialectic a process
of self-realization and understanding that culminates in pure
knowledge. This state is ultimately achieved through philosophy,
though it is initially preceded by an interrogation into the qualities
of religion and art. As Danto summarized in a later essay entitled
»The Disenfranchisement of Art« (1984):
When art internalizes its own history, when it becomes self-conscious
of its history as it has come to be in our time, so that its consciousness
of its history forms part of its nature, it is perhaps unavoidable
that it should turn into philosophy at last. And when it does
so, well, in an important sense, art comes to an end.
Danto is not the only philosopher to have adopted an Hegelian
dialectic. Both Francis Fukuyama and Karl Marx utilized Hegelianism
to reach their own historical conclusions. Fukuyama argued that
liberal democracy and free market capitalism represented the zenith
of Western civilization, whilst Marx argued that communism would
replace capitalism (neither of these developments have quite panned
out). **
Arthur C. Danto wrote:
HEGELS END-OF ART THESIS.
»Art , considered in its highest voc ation, is and remains
for us a thing of the past. Thereby it has lost for us genuine
truth and life, and has rather been transferred into our ideas
instead of maintaining its earlier necessity in reality and
occupying its higher place.« - Hegels
Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Arts. Translated by T. M.
Knox. Oxford; The Clarendon Press, 1975. 10. Unless otherwise
indicated, all references to Hegels writing are to this
superb translation. This is the most forceful of Hegels
many formulations of what we may designate his End-of-Art Thesis,
and it appears very near the beginning of the published version
of his Lectures on Aesthetics - his Vorlesungen über
die Aesthetic - delivered for the fourth and final time
in the Winter Semester of 1828, at the University of Berlin.
The thesis is so intricately woven into the texture of Hegels
text, however, that it must be regarded as a central and indeed
as tructural feature of his philosophy of art, rather than a critical
obiter dictum regarding the art of his time. And it as much addresses
what other philosophers have said about art, as art itself.
Of course art will go on being made. There w ill be art after
the end of art.
»Art can be used as a fleeting play, affording recreation
and entertainment, decorating our surroundings, giving pleasantness
to the externals of our life, and making other objects stand
out by artistic adornm ent.« - Ibid.,
7.
So understood, art will play any number of roles in what Hegel
terms the objective spirit of a society - the system of
meanings and practices that constitute the form of life its members
live. But Hegel was not speaking of art in terms of objective
spirit when he advanced the End-of-Art Thesis.
»The universal need for art ... is mans rational
need to lift the inner and outer world into his spiritual consciousness
as an object in which he recognizes again his own self.«
- Ibid., 31.
That is arts »highest vocation«,to
which alone the End-of-Art Thesis has application. So the truth
of the thesis was consistent with art, and even great art, continuing
to be made. In the Epilogue to his lecture, Origins of the
Work of Art (1935-36), Martin Heidegger wrote:
»The judgment that Hegel passes in these statements cannot
be evaded by pointing out that since Hegels lectures ...
we have seen many new art works and art movements arise. Hegel
did not mean to deny this possibility. The question, however,
remains: is art still an essential and necessary way in which
truth that is decisive for our historical existence happens,
or is art no longer of this character?« -
Martin Heidegger, »The Origin
of the Work of Art«. Translation by Albert Hofstadter,
Philosophies of Art and Beauty: Selected Readings in Aesthetics
from Plato to Heidegger. Edited by Albert Hofstadter and
Richard Kuhns. New York; The Modern Library, 1964. 700.
.... **
The end of art could be a sign, an omen for the end of history
in the relatively soon future.
So, we should not claim that nobody is making art any more, but
that a certain history of western art has come to an end, in about
the way that Hegel suggested it would. The end of art
refers to the beginning of our modern era of art in which art no
longer adheres to the constraints of imitation theory but serves
a new purpose. But what exactly serves this new purpose?
A sign or omen for the end of states in the relatively soon future
could be the following impression:
The more I look at the modern state versus anarchy or anarchism
I am coming to the conclusion that they are essentially the same
thing. This might of not been the case with states of the past
(especially our ancient past) but again certainly can be said
of the modern ones. Modern states are becoming more chaotic, disorderly,
unorganized, self destructive, and socially conflicting internally.
These are the kind of things you would expect in an existence
of anarchy and not that of a governed state of society that prides
itself on social order. **
It will likely take time before this description will become reality.
But the thing is that some certain indicators have been being perceptible
for a relatively long time.
And for example: Is a welfare state with billions of debts still
a well working state? If so: For how long will this last? A huge
crisis - and this state is really bankrupt!
The crash is only a matter of time.
Maybe after the relatively long lasting war - as the last
war -, there will be humans as the last consumers without
any history, without any knowledge about any of their ancestors,
thus without genealogy, without any memory (thus also without any
cultural memory), only with consumption.
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