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NACH OBEN 631) Arminius, 05.02.2015, 20:53, 20:58, 22:47 (2526-2528)


Kant referred to both indeterminism and determinism, because he taught (1) an empirical (thus: close to nature) person and (2) an ethical (thus: close to culture) person. So according to Kant humans are citizens of two „worlds“: (1) a „visible world“ and (2) an „intelligible world“. The humans as (1) empirical (natural) persons or citizens of the „visible world“ do not have an „absolute free will“ becaue they are subordinated by nature and its „law“ of causality; but the humans as (2) ethical (cultural) persons or as citizens of the „intelligible world“ have an „absolute free will“. The „moral law“ is based only on the existence of the „intelligible freedom“(=> 2).

Ted Honderich wrote:

„One summary of the great Kant's view, to the extent that it can be summed up, is that he takes determinism to be a kind of fact, and indeterminism to be another kind of fact, and our freedom to be a fact too -- but takes this situation to have nothing to do with the kind of compatibility of determinism and freedom proclaimed by such Compatibilists as Hobbes and Hume. Thus Kant does not make freedom consistent with determinism by taking up a definition of freedom as voluntariness -- at bottom, being able to do what you want. This he dismisses as a wretched subterfuge, quibbling about words. Rather, the freedom he seeks to make consistent with determinism does indeed seem to be the freedom of the Incompatibilists -- origination. Is he then an Incompatibilist? Well, against that, it can be said he does not allow the existence of origination in what can be called the world we know, as Incompatibilists certainly do.“

Kant's main idea, whatever sense can finally be made of it, depends on his fundamental two-worlds doctrine. He locates determinism in the empirical world or world of appearances, and freedom in the world of things-in-themselves, the world of reason. It is important that the latter world is not in time.

So he is a determinist of a kind, opposed to the tradition of Compatibilism, not really in the Incompatibilist tradition, but tries to make his determinism and freedom-as-origination consistent by his own private means. You may well wonder if he can succeed in all this -- and suspect too, at the beginning of the 21st Century, that something so radical as his view is actually needed.“ **

Who ist Ted Honderich?

Wikipedia wrote:

„Ted Honderich (born 30 January 1933) is a Canadian-born British philosopher, Grote Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic, University College London[1] and Visiting Professor, University of Bath. His work has been mainly about five things: determinism's truth and its consequences for our lives; the nature of consciousness and its relation to the brain; right and wrong in the contemporary world, in particular with respect to terrorism; the supposed justifications of punishment by the state; and the political tradition of conservatism.“ **


Excerpt from The Critique of Pure Reason:

Immanuel Kant wrote:

„.... Every human being has an empirical character for his power of choice, which is nothing other than a certain causality of his reason, insofar as in its effects in appearance this reason exhibits a rule, in accordance with which one could derive the rational grounds and the actions themselves according to their kind and degree, and estimate the subjective principles of his power of choice. Because this empirical character itself must be drawn from appearances as effect, and from the rule which experience provides, all the actions of the human being in appearance are determined in accord with the order of nature by his empirical character and the other cooperating causes; and if we could investigate all the appearances of his power of choice down to their basis, then there would be no human action that we could not predict with certainty, and recognize as necessary given its preceding conditions. Thus in regard to this empirical character there is no freedom, and according to this character we can consider the human being solely by observing, and, as happens in anthropology, by trying to investigate the moving causes of his actions physiologically

But if we consider the very same actions in relation to reason, not, to be sure, in relation to speculative reason, in order to explain them as regards their origin, but insofar as reason is the cause of producing them by themselves — in a word, if we compare them with reason in a practical respect — then we find a rule and order that is entirely other than the natural order. For perhaps everything that has happened in the course of nature, and on empirical grounds inevitably had to happen, nevertheless ought not to have happened. At times, however, we find, or at least believe we have found, that the ideas of reason have actually proved their causality in regard to the actions of human beings as appearances, and that therefore these actions have occurred not through empirical causes, no, but because they were determined by grounds of reason.

Suppose now that one could say reason has causality in regard to appearance; could reason’s action then be called free even though in its empirical character (in the mode of sense) it is all precisely determined and necessary? The empirical character is once again determined in the intelligible character (in the mode of thought). We are not acquainted with the latter, but it is indicated through appearances, which really give only the mode of sense (the empirical character) for immediate cognition. Now the action, insofar as it is to be attributed to the mode of thought as its cause, nevertheless does not follow from it in accord with empirical laws, i.e. in such a way that it is preceded by the conditions of pure reason, but only their effects in the appearance of inner sense precede it. Pure reason, as a merely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the form of time, and hence not subject to the conditions of the temporal sequence. The causality of reason in the intelligible character does not arise or start working at a certain time in producing an effect. For then it would itself be subject to the natural law of appearances, to the extent that this law determines causal series in time, and its causality would then be nature and not freedom.

Thus we could say that if reason can have causality in regard to appearances, then it is a faculty through which the sensible condition of an empirical series of effects first begins. For the condition that lies in reason is not sensible and does not itself begin. Accordingly, there takes place here what we did not find in any empirical series: that the condition of a successive series of occurrences could itself be empirically unconditioned. For here the condition is outside the series of appearances (in the intelligible) and hence not subject to any sensible condition or to any determination of time through any passing cause.

Nevertheless, this very same cause in another relation also belongs to the series of appearances. The human being himself is an appearance. His power of choice has an empirical character, which is the (empirical) cause of all his actions. There is not one of these conditions determining human beings according to this character which is not contained in the series of natural effects and does not obey the laws of nature according to which no empirically unconditioned causality is present among the things that happen in time. Hence no given action (since it can be perceived only as appearance) can begin absolutely from itself. But of reason one cannot say that before the state in which it determines the power of choice, another state precedes in which this state itself is determined. For since reason itself is not an appearance and is not subject at all to any conditions of sensibility, no temporal sequence takes place in it even as to its causality, and thus the dynamical law of nature, which determines the temporal sequence according to rules, cannot be applied to it.

Reason is thus the persisting condition of all voluntary actions under which the human being appears. Even before it happens, every one of these actions is determined beforehand in the empirical character of the human being. In regard to the intelligible character, of which the empirical one is only the sensible schema, no before or after applies, and every action, irrespective of the temporal relation in which it stands to other appearances, is the immediate effect of the intelligible character of pure reason; reason therefore acts freely, without being determined dynamically by external or internal grounds temporally preceding it in the chain of natural causes, and this freedom of reason can not only be regarded negatively, as independence from empirical conditions (for then the faculty of reason would cease to be a cause of appearances), but also indicated positively by a faculty of beginning a series of occurrences from itself, in such a way that in reason itself nothing begins, but as the unconditioned condition of every voluntary action, it allows of no condition prior to it in time, whereas its effect begins in the series of appearances, but can never constitute an absolutely first beginning in this series.

In order to clarify the regulative principle of reason through an example of its empirical use — not in order to confirm it (for such proofs are unworkable for transcendental propositions) — one may take a voluntary action, e.g. a malicious lie, through which a person has brought about a certain confusion in society; and one may first investigate its moving causes, through which it arose, judging on that basis how the lie and its consequences could be imputed to the person. WIth this first intent one goes into the sources of the person’s empirical character, seeking them in a bad upbringing, bad company, and also finding them in the wickedness of a natural temper insensitive to shame, partly in carelessness and thoughtlessness; in so doing one does not leave out of account the occasioning causes. In all this one proceeds as with any investigation in the series of determining causes for a given natural effect.

Now even if one believes the action to be determined by these causes, one nonetheless blames the agent, and not on account of his unhappy natural temper, not on account of the circumstances influencing him, not even on account of the life he has led previously; for one presupposes that it can be entirely set aside how that life was constituted, and that the series of conditions that transpired might not have been, but rather that this deed could be regarded as entirely unconditioned in regard to the previous state, as though with that act the agent had started a series of consequences entirely from himself.

This blame is grounded on the law of reason, which regards reason as a cause that, regardless of all the empirical conditions just named, could have and ought to have determined the conduct of the person to be other than it is. And indeed one regards the causality of reason not as a mere concurrence with other causes, e but as complete in itself, even if sensuous incentives were not for it but were indeed entirely against it; the action is ascribed to the agent’s intelligible character: now, in the moment when he lies, it is entirely his fault; hence reason, regardless of all empirical conditions of the deed, is fully free, and this deed is to be attributed entirely to its failure to act.“

Excerpt from The Critique of Practical Reason:

Immanuel Kant wrote:

„The concept of causality as natural necessity, as distinguished from the concept of causality as freedom, concerns only the existence of things insofar as it is determinable in time and hence as appearances, as opposed to their causality as things in themselves. Now, if one takes the determinations of the existence of things in time for determinations of things-in-themselves (which is the most usual way of representing them), then the necessity in the causal relation can in no way be united with freedom; instead they are opposed to each other as contradictory. For, from the first it follows that every event, and consequently every action that takes place at a point of time, is necessary under the condition of what was in the preceding time. Now, since time past is no longer within my control, every action that I perform must be necessary by determining grounds that are not within my control, that is, I am never free at the point of time in which I act.

Indeed, even if I assume that my whole existence is independent from any alien cause (such as God), so that the determining grounds ot my causality and even of my whole existence are not outside me, this would not in the least transform that natural necessity into freedom. For, at every point of time I still stand under the necessity of being determined to action by that which is not within my control, and the series of events infinite a parte priori which I can only continue in accordance with a predetermined order would never begin of itself: it would be a continuous natural chain, and therefore my causality would never be freedom.

If, then, one wants to attribute freedom to a being whose existence is determined in time, one cannot, so far at least, except this being from the law of natural necessity as to all events in its existence and consequently as to its actions as well; for, that would be tantamount to handing it over to blind chance. But since this law unavoidably concerns all causality of things so far as their existence in time is determinable, if this were the way in which one had to represent also the existence of these things-in-themselves then freedom would have to be rejected as a null and impossible concept.

Consequently, if one still wants to save it, no other path remains than to ascribe the existence of a thing so far as it is determinable in time, and so too its causality in accordance with the law of natural necessity, only to appearance, and to ascribe freedom to the same being as a thing-in-itself. This is certainly unavoidable if one wants to maintain both these mutually repellent concepts together; but in application, when one wants to explain them as united in one and the same action, and so to explain this union itself, great difficulties come forward, which seem to make such a unification unfeasible.

If I say of a human being who commits a theft that this deed is, in accordance with the natural law of causality, a necessary result of determining grounds in preceding time, then it was impossible that it could have been left undone; how, then, can appraisal in accordance with the moral law make any change in it and suppose that it could have been omitted because the law says that it ought to have been omitted? That is, how can that man be called quite free at the same point of time and in regard to the same action in which and in regard to which he is nevertheless subject to an unavoidable natural necessity?

It is a wretched subterfuge to seek to evade this by saying that the kind of determining grounds of his causality in accordance with natural law agrees with a comparative concept of freedom, according to which that is sometimes called a free effect, the determining natural ground of which lies within the acting being, e.g., that which a projectile accomplishes when it is in free motion, in which case one uses the word »freedom« because while it is in flight it is not impelled from without; or as we also call the motion of a clock a free motion because it moves the hands itself, which therefore do not need to be pushed externally; in the same way the actions of the human being, although they are necessary by their determining grounds which preceded them in time, are yet called free because the actions are caused from within, by representations produced by our own powers, whereby desires are evoked on occasion of circumstances and hence actions are produced at our own discretion.

Some still let themselves be put off by this subterfuge and so think they have solved, with a little quibbling about words, that difficult problem on the solution of which millennia have worked in vain and which can therefore hardly be found so completely on the surface, That is to say, in the question about that freedom which must be put at the basis of all moral laws and the imputation appropriate to them, it does not matter whether the causality determined in accordance with a natural law is necessary through determining grounds lying within the subject or outside him, or in the first case whether these determining grounds are instinctive or thought by reason, if, as is admitted by these men themselves, these determining representations have the ground of their existence in time and indeed in the antecedent state; and this in turn in a preceding state, and so forth.

These determinations may be internal and they may have psychological instead of mechanical causality, that is, produce actions by means of representations and not by bodily movements; [still] they are always determinining grounds of the causality of a being insofar as its existence is determinable in time and therefore under the necessitating conditions of past time, which are thus, when the subject is to act, no longer within his control and which may therefore bring with them psychological freedom (if one wants to use this term for a merely internal chain of representations in the soul) but nevertheless natural necessity; and they therefore leave no transcendental freedom, which must be thought as independence from everything empirical and so from nature generally, whether it is regarded as an object of inner sense in time only or also of outer sense in both space and time; without this freedom (in the latter and proper sense), which alone is practical a priori, no moral law is possible and no imputation in accordance with it.

Just for this reason, all necessity of events in time in accordance with the natural law of causality can be called the mechanism of nature, although it is not meant in this that the things which are subject to it must be really material machines. Here one looks only to the necessity of the connection of events in a time series as it develops in accordance with natural law, whether the subject in which this development takes place is called automaton materiale, when the machinery is driven by matter, or with Leibniz spirituale, when it is driven by representations; and if the freedom of our will were none other than the latter (say, psychological and comparative but not also transcendental, i.e., absolute), then it would at bottom be nothing better than the freedom of a turnspit, which, when once it is wound up, also accomplishes its movements of itself.

Now, in order, in the case at hand, to remove the apparent contradiction between the mechanism of nature and freedom in one and the same action, one must recall what was said in the Critique of Pure Reason or follows from it: that the natural necessity which cannot coexist with the freedom of the subject attaches merely to the determinations of a thing which stands under conditions of time and so only to the determinations of the acting subject as appearance, and that, accordingly, the determining grounds of every action of the subject so far lie in what belongs to past time and is no longer within his control (in which must be counted his past deeds and the character as a phenomenon thereby determinable for him in his own eyes).

But the very same subject, being on the other side conscious of himself as a thing-in-itself, also views his existence insofar as it does not stand under conditions of time and himself as determinable only through laws that he gives himself by reason; and in this existence of his nothing is, for him, antecedent to the determination of his will, but every action — and in general every determination of his existence changing conformably with inner sense, even the whole sequence of his existence as a sensible being — is to be regarded in the consciousness of his intelligible existence as nothing but the consequence and never as the determining ground of his causality as a noumenon.

So considered, a rational being can now rightly say of every unlawful action he performed that he could have omitted it even though as appearance it is sufficiently determined in the past and, so far, is inevitably necessary; for this action, with all the past which determines it, belongs to a single phenomenon of his character, which he gives to himself and in accordance with which he imputes to himself, as a cause independent of all sensibility, the causality of those appearances.

The judicial sentences of that wonderful capacity in us which we call conscience are in perfect agreement with this. A human being may use what art he will to paint some unlawful conduct he remembers as an unintentional fault — as a mere oversight which one can never avoid altogether, and so as something in which he was carried away by the stream of natural necessity — and to declare himself innocent of it. He nevertheless finds that the advocate who speaks in his favor can by no means reduce to silence the prosecutor within him, if only he is aware that at the time he did this wrong he was in his senses, that is, had the use of his freedom; and while he explains his misconduct by certain bad habits, which by gradual neglect of attention he has allowed to grow in him to such a degree that he can regard his misconduct as their natural consequence, yet this cannot protect him from the reproach and censure he casts upon himself.

This is also the ground of repentance for a deed long past at every recollection of it, a painful feeling aroused by the moral disposition, which is empty in a practical way to the extent that it cannot serve to undo what has been done and would even be absurd. (Priestley, a genuine fatalist proceeding consistently, declares it absurd; and for this candor he deserves more applause than those who, while maintaining the mechanism of the will in deeds but its freedom in words, yet want it to be thought that they include it in their syncretistic system, though without making the possibility of such imputation comprehensible.) But repentance, as pain, is still quite legitimate because reason, when it is a question of the law of our intelligible existence (the moral law), recognizes no distinction of time and asks only whether the event belongs to me as a deed and, if it does, then always connects the same feeling with it morally, whether it was done just now or long ago. For, the sensible ljfe has, with respect to the intelligible consciousness of its existence (consciousness of freedom), the absolute unity of a phenomenon, which, so far as it contains merely appearances of the disposition that the moral law is concerned with (appearances of the character), must be appraised not in accordance with the natural necessity that belongs to it as appearance but in accordance with the absolute spontaneity of freedom.

One can therefore grant that if it were possible for us to have such deep insight into a human being’s cast of mind, as shown by inner as well as outer actions, that we would know every incentive to action, even the smallest, as well as all the external occasions affecting them, we could calculate a human being’s conduct for the future with as much certainty as a lunar or solar eclipse and could nevertheless maintain that the human being’s conduct is free. If, that is to say, we were capable of another view, namely an intellectual intuition of the same subject (which is certainly not given to us and in place of which we have only the rational concept), then we would become aware that this whole chain of appearances, with respect to all that the moral law is concerned with, depends upon the spontaneity of the subject as a thing-in-itself, for the determination of which no physical explanation can be given.

In default of this intuition, the moral law assures us of this difference between the relation of our actions as appearances to the sensible being of our subject and relation by which this sensible being is itself referred to the intelligible substratum in us. From this perspective, which is natural to our reason though inexplicable, appraisals can be justified which, though made in all conscientiousness, yet seem at first glance quite contrary to all equity. There are cases in which human beings, even with the same education that was profitable to others, yet show from childhood such early wickedness and progress in it so continuously into their adulthood that they are taken to be born villains and quite incapable of improvement as far as their cast of mind is concerned; and nevertheless they are so judged for what they do or leave undone that they are censured as guilty of their crimes; indeed, they themselves (the children) find these censures as well founded as if, despite the hopeless natural constitution of minds ascribed to the, they remained as accountable as any other human being.

This could not happen if we did not suppose that whatever arises from one’s choice (as every action intentionally performed undoubtedly does) has as its basis a free causality which from early youth expresses its character in its appearances (actions); these actions, on account of the uniformity of conduct, make knowable a natural connection that does not, however, make the vicious constitution of the will necessary but is instead the consequence of the evil and unchangeable principles freely adopted, which make it only more culpable and deserving of punishment.“


Many phenomena correlate with each other, thus also the population growth (fertility rate and mortality rate), the economic growth, the cultural development, the development of intelligence. The most important phenomena are summarized in the HDI (Human Development Index). The following map shows the HDI ranking list:


For example: „dark green“ means the highest HDI (?0,900 and higher); „dark red means“ the lowest HDI (0,349 and lower).

Correlation of population and economy.
P=>E) In the short-term the population growth influences the economic development positively; in the long-term it influences it negatively because of other phenomena which are long-term phenomena (culture /education, intelligence).
E=>P) In the short-term the economic growth influences the population development positively; in the long-term it influences it negatively (long-lasting wealth leads to decadence).


NACH OBEN 632) Arminius, 06.02.2015, 00:03, 01:03 (2529-2530)


Provided that each (thus: one) human had his / her own, thus a so-called „individual“ language and / or a so-called „individual“ ontology, do you believe that some or even many humans would agree on their languages and / or ontologies?


They can be afraid of losing their „individual“ languages / ontologies, because they don't know whether the other „inidividual“ languages / ontologies are in agreement with their own, thus their „individual“ languages / ontologies. How can they be sure that their „individual“ languages / ontologies become one „inter-individual“ or „societal“ language / ontology (so to speak: as an „individual“ language / ontology of a society) without any loss?


NACH OBEN 633) Arminius, 07.02.2015, 04:23, 04:37, 20:58, 22:25, 22:59 (2531-2535)


I don't like the BBC weather report, I like the Mags weather report.


Hume said that there is no knowledge or epistemology of causality by reason / rationality but only by experience. So according to Hume cause and effects can not be discovered by mere reason / rationality but merely by experience. He said that there is no knowledge or epistemology by reason / rationality / a priori.


Hello, Project (Machine Project?).

Project 2501 wrote:

„Arminius wrote:

»When it comes to distinguish the nature of human beings from the nature of other living beings, then human nature is human culture/s. Although it is difficult to say whether there is one human culture or several human cultures, I would say, if I had to refer to merely one human culture, that a human being is a luxury being. In another thread I said:

›The luxury is a very special phenomenon, especially for human beings. Human beings are luxury beings. They make their artificial island of luxury in the sea of nature. Evolution is not just about adaptation to nature, but also about distancing from nature, thus about the luxury islands.‹ ** **

Only human beings (thus no other living beings) are able to distance or disassociate themselves so much from nature. Humans live on islands of luxury. They have their human bubbles like hulls / shells, caves, huts / cottages, houses, beyond that: castles, churches / cathedrals, cities, city states, states, nations, empires, global empires ... and so forth. Because they are much more spiritual / mental / intellectual than other creatures, they have not only a bodily but also a spiritual immune system. This spiritual immune system is the main cause of the enormous luxury and the characteristic feature of human culture/s. Because of the fact that there are many different spiritual immune systems of humans possible, one should rather speak of several human cultures and not of one human culture.« ** **

So culture is the same as nature?“ **

No. Culture it is not the same as nature, but it is a part of nature. I said: »When it comes to distinguish the nature of human beings from the nature of other living beings, then human nature is human culture/s.« (**|**). That does not mean that nature and culture are the same. They are similar, not the same. There are analogies between them.

Naturally human beings are animal beings, but culturally human beings are not animal beings but human beings (just becaue of their culture). Of course, there are feedbacks between nature and culture, thus also between human nature and human culture. But if it comes to distinguish the nature of human beings from the nature of other living beings, then human nature is human culture/s. And one of the main features of human culture/s is luxury.

Project wrote:

„Can you say more about humans being defined apart from animals because of luxury?“ **

Yes. I can.



Yes, that's right (**). Hume was a diplomat, and, although he was also a philosopher of the Occidental Enlightenment, he was not a good logician, not a good rationalist, and thus not a good proponent of the Enlightenment. According tu Hume thinking is not more than a function, for example in order to link / join / connect, to shift / convert / permute, to widen / extend / expand, or to cut / shrink / reduce what the senses and experience liver. So according to Hume thinking (logic, rationality, ..., thus just the characteristics of the Occidental Enlightenment) is less important than senses and experience; according to Hume thinking is merely a slave of senses and experience.


Yes, unfortunately, you don't get paid for your weather report. I don't get paid for my weather report as well as you, but nonetheless:
Here „comes“ my weather report:
There is snow in my garden, but not much, and it is frozen snow. The temperature is about 0°Celsius (= 32° Fahrenheit). It is not windy.
One month ago, thus on 7 January 2015, there was no snow, and it was not cold: about 10°Celsius (= 50° Fahrenheit). It was very stormy.

And you can easily guess what happened to some people between 7 January 2015 and 7 February 2015.


NACH OBEN 634) Arminius, 08.02.2015, 00:26, 03:42, 04:37, 20:25, 22:23 (2536-2540)


Obama does what he has to do. The US presidents are paid. That is the reason for their contradictory speeches, their hypocrisy, their double standards, their lies, ..., and so on and so forth ....


Amorphos wrote:

„If you are dead in this universe you must be alive in another?“ **

Why shoud I?

Do you mean that the soul of a dying or already dead person goes through a black hole in order to enter another universe? And if so: Do you believe that you will ever know whether that will happen to you or/and your soul or not? And if you believe that: Would you then say that the black hole is similar to God or/and his „Last Judgement“ and the another universe is similar to haeven or/and hell? And if so: Do you want others to believe that as well? Such a religion, or anti-religion, or syn-religion would be similar to those the humans already have. So: Do you believe that this religion, or anti-religion, or syn-religion is going to be established? And if so: For all or almost all humans? And if so: Why do you believe that?

And if you do not want to argue religiously: Why did you ask your question? Do you have any proof or evidence? I guess that you do not have any; therefore my last question: Is my guess right?

Perhaps you are interested in the following thread: ** **


Jr Wells wrote:

„Arminius wrote:

»Obama does what he has to do. The US presidents are paid. That is the reason for their contradictory speeches, their hypocrisy, their double standards, their lies, ..., and so on and so forth ....« ** **

They are the exact qualities we want in our leaders.

Really... would we vote in a rational politician who says it like it is? I do not think so.“ **

Most humans do not always want politicians to say the truth. But what about the others? And sometimes most humans want politicians to say the truth, so that the politicians have no chance anymore with their contradictory speeches, their hypocrisy, their double standards, their lies, ..., and so on and so forth ....

Jr Wells wrote:

„We, as a society, are far too shallow and self interested.
Instead we, as a society, subconsciously vote in the qualities that we admire within ourselves (which are in red above).“ **

That's almost right. But that is also a question of quantity and quality. Most humans are far too shallow and self interested and subconsciously vote in the qualities that they admire within themselves. But what about the others? And sometimes most humans are not too shallow and self interested and do not subconsciously vote in the qualities that they admire within themselves.

The main problem is that most humans are too late with their awareness, too slow with their bringing to awareness, they know too late, thus they are too stupid or ignorant, or just too decadent and hedonistic. This fact is used / misused by the rulers. The history is full of such examples.


Kriswest wrote:

„It is going to be 70° Fahrenheit today.... yea!!! My feet get to thaw out!!! Frozen cold wet fields, steel toed boots make for frozen pain filled feet.“ **

70° Fahrenheit? That's about 21° Celsius. So I guess that you live in a subtropic region.

I need four (exactly four) seasons.



Kriswest wrote:

„I do too, mild, mid warm, warm and hot ....“ **

But „mild, mid warm, warm, hot“ are not features of four seasons but merely of two seasons like „dry period“ and „rain period“.

Have you ever lived in a zone with real four seasons?

Humans were „born“ in areas of merely two seasons and developed into areas of four seasons and into areas of other two seasons (namely in the polar regions). So originally, thus more (not only) naturally, we are beings of the two seasons in warm or hot areas, but being on our way, thus more (not only) culturally, we are also beings of the four seasons, of the two seasons in the coldest areas (polar regions), and in some sense even of the one „season“ in the outer space. We became beings that can live in both the hottest and the coldest climate zones and in some sense, as I said, even in the outer space. That's great and terrible, fortune and fate, destiny. Isn't it?


NACH OBEN 635) Arminius, 09.02.2015, 00:08, 01:14, 01:40, 02:05, 02:06, 02:08, 02:50, 04:16, 05:54 (2541-2549)


Prismatic wrote:

„Arminius wrote:

»Naturally human beings are animal beings, but culturally human beings are not animal beings but human beings (just because of their culture). Of course, there are feedbacks between nature and culture, thus also between human nature and human culture.« ** **

But if it comes to distinguish the nature of human beings from the nature of other living beings, then human nature is human culture/s. And one of the main features of human culture/s is luxury.
In another perspective;

If human nature is 100%, it can also be represented as the combination of,
98% animal nature + 2% specific human nature.“ **

That is also my estimation and assessment. But these 2% are not really few - we know it, especially from genetics.

Prismatic wrote:

„Despite the significant difference in the external expressions of humans as distinct from other living things, I think the above combination is applicable to describe human nature.

For example, if we were to transplant that 2% of human properties to our nearest primates, they would like to be very similar to humans in time.
At present primates/dolphins already have some degree of culture that are similar to humans, i.e. the use of tool, games, language, deliberated evil, etc.“ **

The use of tools that do not belong to the own body are alrerady a prestage of luxury; the use of language, if it is close to the value of the human language, as well; games do all mammals have (maybe it is a pre-prestage of luxury). B.t.w.: Luxury can be measured by the degree of insulation. The more living beings are able to live on an own „island“ (meant as a metaphor!), the more they are luxury beings. Or, in other words, the more living beings are able to behave against the Darwinistic evolution, the more they are luxury beings. Insulations give those beings a relative (!) independence of adaptation to nature. The adaptation to nature has not vanished but has been added by dissociation of nature. And the only living being that has achieved this independence in a sufficient extent is the human being.

The question is how we value this relative (!) independence. This relative independence is caused by insulation or dissociation of nature with the main effect: luxury. And this insulation is (a) natuarlly caused by the relatively huge brain and (b) culturally caused by the huge consciousness, awareness, knowkedge, language of human beings.

That's an interesting theme.


In modern secular words religion is ideology. I estimate that 99% of all ILP members are religious (and most of this 99% are religious in the modern secular way), and the most religious ILP members are those who say and say and say they were not religious


Whether „alpha males and their mates get the first resources in almost any specie“ (**) or not is obviously not important for luxury beings. Are Occidental humans alpha males and their mates? Do they have the most descendants? No! The reverse is true: They have the least descendants. Do the humans with the most descendants (thus currently the Black humans in Africa) get the first resources? No!

Humans do not completely fit in the scheme of the Darwinistic evolution theory!


Ecmandu wrote:

„Speech is behavior ....“ **

No. Speech is very much more than that.

Ecmandu wrote:

„Time is just patterned motion, motion implies substance, substance implies space... the list seems..hmm... inarticulate.“ **

How can you experience that time exists? How can you experience that there is patterned motion? It is only possible if you can distinguish, thus if you can realise the change.

So the concept that comes very close to the concept „time“ is the concept „change“.


Copied post in another thread.


Copied post in another thread.


Kriswest wrote:

„I was born and raised in the Sonoran desert and now live in swamplands of Southern Mississippi. If it drops below 70° I am chilled.. I work outside, love my job even in 20° or less. It just hurts like hell while doing it.“ **

Hey! The Sonoran desert is in Mexico and in two parts of the United States, namely in the states California and Arizona, and the Sonoran desert is not very near to the swampslands of Southern Mississipi. But nevertheless: You are a „warm one“.

Is the temperature 20° Fahrenheit (thus: -6.7° Celsius) a rarity or a normality in that correlating „season“? In Europe, especially in West and West-Central Europe the average winter-temperature is often higher than +2° Celsius (35.6° Fahrenheit) - caused by the Gulf Stream.



The natural cause of the relative (!) independence of human beings is their brain, and the cultural cause or reason of the relative (!) independence of human beings is their huge consciousness, awareness, knowkedge, language. So we owe our relative independence (relative free will) to our brain.

The development of our brain is almost a miracle, a wonder.


In the case of the humans self-consciousness with its epiphenomenon egoism is one aspect, yes, but the main aspect is the insulation (dissociation of nature) which leads to luxury and is naturally caused by the brain. So we have (1) the brain, (2) the insulation (dissociation of nature), (3) the luxury and also the self-consciousness with its epiphenomenon egoism and many other features, but it is more the luxury that leads to the self-consciousness than it is the self-consciousness that leads to luxury. Some animals have self-consciousness in almost the degree that human children in the age of 1 to 2 years have, but these animals do not have luxury in the degree that human children in the age of 1 to 2 years have. And human children become egoistic in that typical human way (you said: „extreme“) after that age, usually when they are older than 2 years. Luxury is more a communal than a personal matter.The human development is more a communal than a personal („individual“) development. The human development is more a cultural than a natural development, because the natural development of the humans is more (about 98%; see above) an animal development than a human development.

Naturally you need a relative large and a very complex brain, if you want to become a human being, but then, when that brain exists, your further development is more a cultural than a natural development. The huge consciousness (with its accordingly huge self-consciousness), the huge knowledge, the huge and complex language, ... were naturally caused by the brain but would be totally useless, if their development were merely a natural development. The humans are humans very much more because of their cultural development than because of their natural development. Naturally humans are 98%-animals, but culturally humans are 98%-humans.


NACH OBEN 636) Arminius, 10.02.2015, 00:50 (2550)


I know Chomsky's language theory very well, because I have studied linguistics as well. Philosophically, Chomsky is influenced by the German philosophers Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Wilhelm von Humboldt.


NACH OBEN 637) Arminius, 11.02.2015, 13:44 (2551)


Prismatic wrote:

„Arminius wrote:

»Naturally humans are 98%-animals, but culturally humans are 98%-humans.« ** **

So is, naturally primates are 99.9%-animals, but culturally primates are 99.9%-primates.
(primates do have 'culture' but very insignificant if compared to humans)

What about this;
Naturally humans are 98%-animals, but 'nurturally' humans are 98%-humans.“ **

If you consider „nurture“ as a main aspect of human culture: yes. Naturally humans are 98%-animals, but culturally humans are 98%-humans.

Project wrote:

„Arminius wrote:

»Project wrote:

›Can you say more about humans being defined apart from animals because of luxury?‹ **

Yes. I can.« ** **

Will you?“ **



NACH OBEN 638) Arminius, 12.02.2015, 14:44, 21:38 (2552-2253)


Project wrote:

„When?“ **

Like I said (**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**): Human beings are luxury beings.

Evolution is not just about adaptation to nature, to environment, but also about distancing from nature, from environment, thus about the „luxury islands“.

Human beings are the only living beings that can disassociate themselves from nature in such a dimension that they do not completely have to adapt themselves to nature, to their natural environment. They can destroy the nature just for fun. Other living beings can also have a little bit luxury, but their luxury is always embedded in their immediate nature, their natural environment. They are not able to overcome their dependence of nature. They remain living creatures in the sense of Darwinism: those that are successful have the most descendants, and those that are not successful have the less or no descendants and die out. Luxury beings are the only living beings that can show also the opposite direction: being successful and having less or no descendants (children) and beeing unsuccessful and having the most descendants (children). This two cases would immediately lead to extinction, if they were completely embedded in nature, in natural environment. In the case of human beings it does not lead to extinction, if they are in situations of independence of nature; they often are in such situations, and then It depends on human decisions whether a group of human beings or even all human beings die out or not. Humans have two natures: (1) the real nature which all other living beings also have, (2) their own nature as their culture(s) which is (are) much independend of the real nature.

So when I say „human nature is human culture/s“, then I mean that - in a pure natural sense - humans are 98%-animals; so in this sense they have a 98%-animal nature and merely a 2%-human nature, but this 2% are their culture/s. And in a pure cultural sense this relation is inversely proportional.

If humans are humans to 100%, then merely to 2% because of their nature; but to 98% because of their culture/s!


Orb wrote:

„The most implicit distinction between Man and cockroaches is in his ability to dream. If cockroaches could dream, they would look like armored, iron men by now. Perhaps this is somewhat what Kafka may have had in mind.“ **

Well, ... „in mind“? Perhaps you know that Kafka was not a philosopher but mentally ill - like many others of his „sort“.

Kafka wrote down what was in his mind, yes, but in his mind was no contribution to the solution of the problem of human nature. In his mind was merely he himself. So, metaphorically spoken, he himself was the beetle (you say: „cockroach“). But a beetle (and also your „cockroach“) is definitely no human.

It is not true that „the most implicit distinction“ between humans and cockroaches is in the „ability to dream“ (Orb). Many animals can dream.

Do dreaming animals dream typical human dreams?




NACH OBEN 639) Arminius, 13.02.2015, 19:42 (2554)


Do you know Daniel L. Everett?

The newest „alternative“ to Chomsky?


NACH OBEN 640) Arminius, 14.02.2015, 00:12 (2555)


Hello, (Machine) Project, I have answered your question (**|**).